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Abstract
This paper provides a general characterization of optimal export promoting poli-
cies for foreign competitive markets and apply it to strategic trade policy and exchange
rate policy. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy under barriers
to entry in the third market, I ﬁnd that it is always optimal to subsidize exports as long
as entry is free (under both strategic substitutability and complementarity) and I ex-
plicitly derive the optimal export subsidies under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Finally, I show that there is always a strategic incentive to implement competitive
devaluations when entry in foreign markets is free, but not otherwise.
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1What are the strategic advantages that export promoting policies create
for domestic ﬁrms? What is the optimal trade policy with respect to exporting
ﬁrms? How much should we invest to promote international demand of domestic
products? Do competitive devaluations give a real advantage to national ﬁrms
in the foreign markets? There is a lot of debate about these questions between
policymakers. This is not surprising since also at a theoretical level there are
not clear or unambiguous answers. This paper provides a uniﬁed framework to
rethink about the real advantages of the policies of export promotion both in
terms of trade policy and exchange rate policy.
Common wisdom on the beneﬁts of export subsidization largely departs from
the implications of trade theory. While export promotion is often seen as welfare
enhancing at least in the short run and often supported by governments, theory
is hardly in favour of its direct or indirect forms. In the standard neoclassical
theory with perfect competition, the scope of trade policy is to improve the
terms of trade, that is the price of exports relative to the price of imports, and,
as long as a country is large enough to aﬀect the terms of trade, it is optimal
to tax exports (since this is equivalent to set a tariﬀ on imports). The same
outcome emerges under monopolistic competition, as shown by Helpman and
Krugman (1989). In case of imperfect competition, a second aim of strategic
trade policy is to shift proﬁts toward the domestic ﬁrms, hence a large body of
literature has studied models with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms competing in a third
market with positive proﬁts. Here, the optimal unilateral policy is an export tax
under price competition, or whenever strategic complementarity holds (Eaton
and Grossman, 1986). Under quantity competition, an export subsidy can be
optimal (Brander and Spencer, 1984), but only under certain conditions.1 The
same ambiguity of these results “creates information requirements for policy
intervention that appear to many of the architects of this theoretical innovation
to be suﬃciently intimidating to suggest that policymakers had better leave it
alone” (Bhagwati, 1988, p.106).2
Nevertheless, diﬀerent forms of direct or indirect export subsidies are wide-
spread. Governments strongly support exporting ﬁrms, they often hide forms of
export promotion behind nationalistic pride, and consider the conquer of larger
market shares abroad as a positive achievement in itself. The European Union
coordinates trade between its members and the rest of the world in a similar
spirit, and subsidizes exports of agricultural products and the aircraft industry.
France is use to support its “national champions” with public funding. Italy
has a long tradition of public support of the Made in Italy, which is quite im-
1These conditions are derived by Dixit (1984) and Klette (1994). See also Horstmann and
Markusen (1986) for related results.
2The literature has developed other arguments against export subsidies, as in case of
asymmetric information between ﬁrms and government or in case of retaliation (see Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan, 1998, Brander, 1995, and Wong, 1995, for surveis), and some
in their favour, as in case of international competition both at the market level and at a
preliminary R&D level (Zigic, 2003).
2portant for the promotion of fashion, design and food industries. Japan, Korea
and other East-Asian countries have implemented export promoting policies for
decades. Heavily protected South-American countries have tried to subsidize
manufactured products in which they could develop a comparative advantage
(and not only those). Even US has implemented strong forms of export sub-
sidization through tax exemptions for a fraction of export proﬁts, foreign tax
credit3 and export credit subsidies.
It appears quite surprising that, in front of this, trade economists do not
have clear and unambiguous arguments to explain why export subsidies could
be the optimal unilateral trade policy.4 I provide such an argument, studying
a model of trade policy for a foreign market with free entry for international
ﬁrms. Notice that free entry is a realistic assumption since a foreign country
without a domestic ﬁrm in the market can only gain from allowing free entry
of international ﬁrms. Under free entry, export subsidization is always the best
unilateral policy both under quantity and price competition, or, more generally,
under strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity. The intuition is
simple. While ﬁrms are playing some kind of Nash competition in the foreign
market, a government can give a strategic advantage to its domestic ﬁrm with an
appropriate trade policy. When entry is free, an incentive to be accomodating is
always counterproductive, because it just promotes entry by other foreign ﬁrms
and shifts proﬁts away from the domestic ﬁrm. It is instead optimal to provide
an incentive to be aggressive, that is to expand production or (equivalently)
lower the price, since this behaviour limits entry increasing the market share of
the domestic ﬁrm.5 As usual, this is only possible by subsidizing its exports.
The same argument can be applied to other forms of indirect export promotion,
as policies which boost demand or decrease transport costs for the exporting
ﬁrms: as long as these policies increase the marginal proﬁtability of the domestic
ﬁrm, there is a strategic incentive to use them unilaterally.
Last but not least, governments undertake competitive devaluations with
the speciﬁc aim to support exporting ﬁrms. In spite of this, economic theory
is again ambiguous on the merits of these policies. The traditional Mundell-
Fleming model emphasizes the beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀects of unilateral deval-
uations. However, the recent new open-economy macroeconomics shows that
these devaluations can be beggar-thy-self policies (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).6
Moreover, economists tend to underlie the perverse consequences that competi-
tive devaluations have in terms of inﬂationary bias and creation of self-fulﬁlling
3See Desai and Hines (2003) on the impact of the EU complaint before the WTO against
these subsidies: share price of american exporters fell sharply on this news.
4See Boone et al. (2006) and Kovac and Zigic (2006) for a related discussion.
5The result is closely related with recent progress in the theory of market leadership (Etro,
2004; 2006c; 2007). For a lot of material on these issues see www.intertic.org.
6This happens because in presence of imperfectly competitive markets and sticky prices,
they lower the purchasing power of domestic agents’income and this negative terms of trade
externality can more than oﬀset the positive espansionary eﬀect (due to the reduction of real
wages under nominal rigidities).
3ﬁnancial crisis and bank runs, which have a recessionary impact on the real
economy.7
Again, in front of this theoretical ambiguity it is diﬃcult to make sense of the
common wisdom according to which unilateral devaluations provide a positive
strategic advantage on the international markets. Following the pioneeristic
work by Dornbusch (1987), I evaluate the strategic incentives to exchange rate
devaluations in a model where the incidence of exchange rate variations on
prices is endogenous. Strategic eﬀects of devaluations emerge only when ﬁrms
produce at home, not if they directly produce in the foreign market. While
under barriers to entry competitive devaluations may be a bad idea to provide
a strategic advantage to domestic exporters, especially under price competition,
under free entry there is always a strategic incentive to depreciate the currency
to promote exports.
The rationale behind all these forms of exports promotion is always the same
as long as the adoption of these policies helps the domestic ﬁrm to be aggressive
in the foreign market, which is always the case when entry is free in this market.
Ultimately, the scope of export policy is just to conquer market shares abroad
and shift proﬁts from ﬁrms of other countries toward domestic ﬁrms. If we
interpret globalization as the opening up of new markets to international com-
petition we can restate the main result as follows: in a globalized word, there
are strong strategic incentives to conquer market shares abroad by promoting
exports.
The paper contains a very general treatment in Section 1, where I introduce
the model and solve for the strategic incentives to promote exports in presence
of barriers to entry in the international market and with free entry. Sections
2 applies the general results to strategic trade policy: I wrote it in a way that
should be clear to the expert reader independently from the general treatment,
hence he or she may want to skip directly to this application at a ﬁrst reading.
Section 3 applies the general results to a partial equilibrium model of exchange
rate policy. Section 4 concludes. Some extensions and technical details are left
in the Appendix.
1 The Model
To be as general as possible, I will adopt a model of the market structure I
have introduced in Etro (2002a, 2006a), use it to describe competition in a
international market and augment it introducing export promoting policies.
7See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) and Kruman and Obstfeld (2000) on the macroeconomics
of competitive devaluations. Notice also that also competitive devaluations induce perverse
retaliatory reactions and can induce contagion of ﬁnancial crisis. The IMF broadly accepts this
negative view on competitive devaluations and tends to oppose them unless a ﬁxed exchange
rate clearly appears unsustainable.
4Consider a foreign market where n ﬁrms from diﬀerent countries are compet-
ing in Nash strategies. Let us assume that each ﬁrm chooses a strategic variable
xi with i =1 ,2,...,n which delivers the net proﬁt function:
πi = Πi (xi,β i,s i) − F (1)
where βi =
Pn
k=1,k6=i h(xk) for some positive, diﬀerentiable and increasing func-
tion h(·), while F is a ﬁxed cost. The second argument represents the spillovers
induced by the choices of the other ﬁrms on ﬁrm i’s proﬁts. I assume that
Π(xi,β i,s i) is quasiconcave in xi with Π11 < 0.8 Since the main focus will be
on free entry equilibria, I assume that spillovers are negative, Π2 < 0. In general
Π12 could be positive, so that we have strategic complementarity, or negative
so that we have strategic substitutability.
Finally, si is the export policy chosen by the government of country i:i no u r
main application, this is an export subsidy, but we will take in consideration
also other forms of policies which promote exports. I assume that an increase in
the policy raises proﬁts, Π3 > 0, hence I will deﬁne si as an export promotion
policy for country i. I will allow Π13 to be positive or negative: only in the ﬁrst
case, the policy increases marginal proﬁtability. All forms of trade subsidies
under quantity and price competition imply Π13 > 0, but other indirect forms
of export promotion can be characterized by Π13 < 0.
The welfare of country i, W(si), depends positively on the proﬁts of the
domestic ﬁrm and negatively on the cost of its policy. In case of export subsi-
dization, the cost of trade policy is the collection of tax revenue, but this may
imply tax distortions or other kinds of costs due to general equilibrium or polit-
ical considerations. Moreover, in case of lobbying activity, the weight given by
the politicians to the costs of the policy may be smaller. Finally, other forms of
export promotion can have diﬀerent costs for national welfare. Nevertheless, in
line with the literature on strategic trade policy, our focus will be mainly on the
strategic incentive to export promotion, which will be deﬁned as the indirect
marginal beneﬁto fa ni n c r e a s ei nsi on the proﬁt:
SI = Π2 (xi,β i,s i)
∂βi
∂si
As long as this is positive, the government of country i has a strategic reason
for promoting exports beyond any direct reason which depends on the ﬁrst order
impact of policy on welfare.
I will now present a few examples of market structures which are nested in
the general model. As a ﬁrst example let us consider a market with substitute







p1 < 0a n dp2 < 0 and the cost function, which includes transport costs, is c(xi)
8In the paper, any subindex refers to derivatives with respect to the corresponding
argument.
5with c0(·) > 0. It follows that:
Πi (xi,β i,0) = xip(xi,β i) − c(xi)( 2 )
where βi =
Pn
k=1,k6=i h(xk). In case of perfectly substitute goods, we have
pi = p(xi + βi)a n dh(xi)=xi.
As a second example let us consider a general class of models of price com-







D1 < 0, D2 < 0, g(p) > 0a n dg0(p) < 0, is nested in our general framework
after setting xi ≡ 1/pi and h(x)=g(1/x), so that h0(x)=−g0(1/x)/x2 > 0.
Under constant marginal costs, gross proﬁts become:













We will assume that strategic complementarity typically holds (Π12 > 0) as it
does under weak conditions. As we will see later on, examples include many well
known demand functions like the constant elasticity demand, the Logit demand
and the demand with constant expenditure, while the linear demand case is not
nested in our general model (indeed, in that case, a free entry equilibrium does
not exist since proﬁts are increasing in the number of ﬁrms). Another important
case which is nested in this speciﬁcation is the model of price competition with
demand al aDixit and Stiglitz (1977), which has been widely employed in the
new trade theory (Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985), and is studied
in Appendix D.
In these basic models of the market structure we can introduce diﬀerent
policies for export promotion. In the rest of this section I will derive the general
results and in the next two sections I will apply them to the typical tools of
trade policies and to the exchange rate policy. The general discussion will be
divided in the two crucial cases: in the ﬁrst the foreign market is closed, in
the sense that there are barriers to entry, in the second, the foreign market is
competitive in the sense that entry is free.
1.1 Strategic policy for closed markets
Let us brieﬂy summarize the results on the optimal unilateral trade policy for
a foreign market with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, assume that
si =0f o ra l lﬁrms except the domestic one, whose policy s is chosen by the gov-
ernment of its home country at an initial stage. Consider the second stage after
a policy s has been chosen and assume that a unique Nash equilibrium exists
with the same strategy for the foreign ﬁrms, say x,a n dad i ﬀerent strategy for
the domestic one, say z, depending on the policy s.T h eﬁrst order equilibrium
6conditions are:9
Π1 [x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(z),0] = 0 (4)
ΠH
1 [z,(n − 1)h(x),s]=0 ( 5 )
Totally diﬀerentiating this system, we have x0(s) T 0i fΠ12ΠH
13 T 0a n d
z0(s) T 0i fΠH
13 T 0. In the initial stage the government will choose the policy
to maximize welfare. Using the envelope theorem and the previous results, we







where ∆ > 0 is the determinant of the equilibrium system. When Π13 > 0,
which (as we will see) is always the case when the policy is subsidization, this
eﬀect is positive under strategic substitutability (Π12 < 0) and negative under
strategic complementarity (Π12 > 0), while the result is inverted when Π13 < 0.
It is now immediate to conclude with:
Proposition 1. Under barriers to entry in the foreign market, a)
when the export policy increases the marginal proﬁtability of the do-
mestic ﬁrm, there is (not) a strategic incentive to export promotion
if strategic substitutability (complementarity) holds, b) when the ex-
port policy decreases the marginal proﬁtability of the domestic ﬁrm,
the opposite holds.
Notice that with just one domestic ﬁrm, the kind of policy does not depend
o nt h en u m b e ro fi n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁrms. The optimal policy implies an aggressive
ﬁrm under strategic substitutability and an accomodating ﬁrm under strategic
complementarity. However, the result is sensitive to the number of domestic
ﬁrms: if this is large enough, there is a bias against export promotion (Dixit,
1984, and Klette, 1994).
Nevertheless, we can conclude with an unambiguous implication: in standard
models of quantity and price competition, the foreign market gains from an
increase in the number of international ﬁrms (since this will increase production
and lower the equilibrium price), hence, it becomes crucial to investigate what
happens under free entry.10
9Given the symmetric equilibrium, I will drop the index i for the international ﬁrms and
use the index H for the domestic one.
10One should keep in mind that free entry may not be always the relevant assumption.
Empirically, few ﬁrms are actually able to export. It seems that there are indeed very large
barriers to exporting, that typically take the form of ﬁxed costs (on top of the variable cost
of shipping goods, tariﬀs and others). Nevertheless it appears reasonable that in a global
context, there are potential entrants in most international markets.
71.2 Strategic policy for competitive markets
I will now assume that the number of potential entrants is great enough that a
zero proﬁt condition pins down the eﬀective number of ﬁrms competing in the
foreign market. The equilibrium conditions are the two ﬁrst order conditions,
(4) and (5), and the zero proﬁt condition which binds on the international ﬁrms
(since these do not proﬁt from the optimal export policy):
Π[x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(z),0] = F (7)
Totally diﬀerentiating the system (4)-(5)-(7) we obtain a fundamental result for
what follows:
proposition 2. Under free entry in the foreign market, a change
in the domestic policy does not aﬀect the equilibrium strategy of all
the other ﬁrms but only their equilibrium number.
Proof: see Appendix A.
The intuition behind Prop. 2 is simple. Optimization by the foreign ﬁrms
and the free entry condition constraining their number pin down the ﬁrst and
the second argument of their proﬁt functions: their strategic variable and the
level of spillovers from the other international ﬁrms and the domestic ﬁrm. This
implies that only the number of international ﬁrms changes with the strategic
variable of the domestic ﬁrm and hence with the strategic policy, while the



















¤ R 0i fΠH
13 R 0
In the initial stage, the government will choose the policy to maximize wel-
fare. Using the envelope theorem and the previous results, we obtain the strate-









Its sign is the sign of Π13, hence:
Proposition 3. U n d e rf r e ee n t r yi nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t ,w h e nt h e
export policy increases (decreases) the marginal proﬁtability of the
domestic ﬁrm, there is (not) a strategic incentive to export promo-
tion.
Notice that the result would not change in presence of more than one do-
mestic ﬁrm, as long as some entry of foreign ﬁrms takes place in equilibrium.11
11Actually, it is immediate to verify that with nH domestic ﬁrms, the equilibrium strategy
8One should keep in mind that our discussion is relevant in the short term,
since in the long run strategic trade policy may induce further eﬀects. First, new
domestic ﬁrms may endogenously enter in the foreign market and drive net prof-
its to zero.12 Moreover, in a more general model, export promoting policies may
create asymmetries in the domestic markets (which are absent in our model).
While these aspects are beyond the scope of the present paper, they should be
kept in mind as possible limitations for our outcomes. Second, other countries
could retaliate introducing export promoting policies as well. This important
extension is left for further research,13 b u ti tm a yr e p r e s e n tal i m i t a t i o no fo u r
case for export promoting policies in a long term perspective. Nevertheless, in
line with the related literature, we believe that it is important to realize which
are the short run strategic incentives to promote exports in alternative contexts,
since policymakers are often more myopic than they should be. In Appendix B
I present a more genaral analysis of optimal export promotion and, following
Grossman and Helpman (1994), of the political economy considerations which
may lead policymakers.
2 Trade Policy
In this section I will apply our general results to the theory of strategic trade
policy. I will derive the optimal strategic unilateral trade policy in diﬀerent
models. The focus will be on speciﬁc subsidies, but similar results could be
obtained with ad valorem subsidies. Finally, I will brieﬂyc o n s i d e ro t h e rf o r m s
of export promotion.








The economics behind this result is interesting: under free entry there is not a terms of
trade eﬀect induced by an export promoting policy (which is present with entry barriers; see
Dixit, 1984): as we will see in the applications, domestic ﬁrms just crowd out foreign ﬁrms.
The same would happen if a limited number of other countries would promote its own exports:
as long as free entry holds on other ﬁr m s ,t h e s ec o u n t r i e sw o u l da d o p tt h es a m ep o l i c ya n d
share the beneﬁts of export promotion.
12Venables (1985) studies a particular example of this case. See also Markusen and Venables
(1988). Brander (1995) summarizes the results on entry for the reciprocal-markets model.
13In such a war, all countries would want to promote exports of their ﬁrms, but, contrary
to the case with barriers to entry, there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium, because all ﬁrms
would make zero proﬁts and each government would prefer not to promote exports anymore.
However, there can be asymmetric equilibria were some countries promote exports and other
do not. More interestingly, these equilibria may be Pareto eﬃcient compared to free trade
with free entry, since they would increase production or lower prices in the foreign country,
while providing some proﬁts to exporting countries.
92.1 Optimal export subsidy with Cournot competition
Consider the general model of quantity competition which allows for imperfect
substitutability between goods. The gross proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm in presence
of an export speciﬁc subsidy is:
ΠH = z [p(z,βH)+s] − c(z)
where we remember that z is now production of the domestic ﬁrm, p(·)i st h e
inverse demand which depends on the spillovers from the production of other
ﬁrms βH, c(·) is the cost function and s is its subsidy. This proﬁt function is
clearly characterized by ΠH
13 =1> 0. The equilibrium ﬁrst order conditions in
the second stage where nash competition takes place in the foreign market are:
p(x,β)+xp1(x,β)=c0(x)
s + p(z,βH)+zp1(z,βH)=c0(z)
where β =( n − 2)h(x)+h(z) is the spillover received by an international ﬁrm
f r o mt h es t r a t e g i e so fa l lt h eo t h e rﬁrms in the market and βH ≡ (n−1)h(x)i s
the spillover received by the domestic ﬁrm. If the number of ﬁrms is given, it
is standard to derive the optimal trade policy. For instance, in case of perfectly




1+1 /[n(1 − χ)]
(9)
where ε ≡− zp0/p is the elasticity of demand (with respect to domestic pro-
duction) and χ ≡− xp00/p0 i st h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft h es l o p eo ft h ei n v e r s ed e m a n d
which represents the degree of convexity of demand. As well known, in the
linear case with demand p = a −
P
xj and marginal cost c we have χ =0a n d
s∗
H(n)=( a − c)(n − 1)/2n>0 but, if demand is convex enough, an export tax
may become optimal.
Let us now consider free entry. In the second stage we have also the zero
proﬁt condition:
xp(x,β)=c(x)+F
The equilibrium system expresses production levels and the number of ﬁrms as
functions of the subsidy s, but we know from Prop. 2 that the production of
foreign ﬁrms x and their spillovers β are actually unaﬀected by changes in the
subsidy, while z(s)a n dβH(s) depend on the subsidy. Hence, we can write the
welfare of the domestic country as the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm net of the
tax revenue necessary to ﬁnance the subsidy:
W(s)=z(s)p(z(s),β H(s)) − c(z) − F =
= z(s)p[z(s),β+ h(x) − h(z)] − c(z) − F
10which has an interior solution for the optimal subsidy (without entry deterrence)
if goods are poor substitutes or if marginal costs are increasing enough. If such
an interior solution exists, it must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition:
p(z(s),β H)+z(s)[p1 (z(s),β H) − p2 (z(s),β H)h0(z)] = c0(z)
which is a complicated implicit expressio n .H o w e v e r ,i fw es u b s t i t u t et h i si nt h e
equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the domestic ﬁrm, we can derive a neater
expression for the optimal export subsidy:
s∗
H =[ −p2 (z,βH)h0(z)]z>0 (10)
Under perfect substitutability, this becomes:
s∗
H = pε > 0 (11)
which is increasing in the elasticity of demand (notice that p is independent
from the subsidy). Moreover, it implies that domestic ﬁrms produce until their
marginal cost equates the equilibrium price (p = c0(z)) and enjoy positive proﬁts
because returns to scale are decreasing for their level of production. Notice that
t h eo p t i m a ls u b s i d yw o u l db et h es a m ei np r e s e n c eo fo t h e rd o m e s t i cﬁrms:
there is not a terms of trade eﬀect because the equilibrium price is independent
from the subsidy, while domestic ﬁrms crowd out foreign ones. It is simple to
derive the optimal ad valorem subsidy in this case: for instance, with perfect
substitutability (11) implies that the optimal rate of export subsidization would
be simply equal to the elasticity of demand.
The role of trade policy is the same as with barriers to entry, but here it is
always optimal to induce an aggressive behaviour of the national ﬁrm, which is
done through subsidization. If there is low substitutability between goods and
the marginal costs are constant or decreasing (or even not too much increasing),
it is even better to set a subsidy which deters entry of international ﬁrms. Such
a subsidy has to satisfy the free entry condition for n slightly smaller than 2,




For instance, consider the linear example. Here, imagining that there is
entry in equilibrium and imposing the free entry condition for a given subsidy
s, we obtain the equilibrium production for each international ﬁrm x =
√
F
and the number of ﬁrms n =( a − c − s)/
√
F −1, which imply total production
Q = a−c−
√
F. Consistently with Prop. 2, the subsidy does not aﬀect the level
of production of the other ﬁrms but decreases their number. The equilibrium
production of the subsidized ﬁrm is instead z =
√
F +s, which generates proﬁts
ΠH =(
√
F + s)2. The government maximizes proﬁts net of the tax revenue








11Since this is always an increasing function of s, it is optimal to increase subsi-
dization as long as there is entry. But entry is deterred at:
s∗
H = a − c − 3
√
F>0 (12)
which is the optimal subsidy. The intuition for this result is the following.
Free entry pins down the equilibrium price level of the foreign ﬁrms as long as
some of them enter. This implies that the choice of the subsidy does not aﬀect
the equilibrium price at which the domestic ﬁrm will sell its production but
increases its market share. Since there are ﬁxed costs of production, an increase
in the market share reduces average costs and hence it increases net proﬁts.
Consequently it is optimal to raise the market share as much as possible, which
amounts to full entry deterrence.
Summarizing:
Proposition 4. Under quantity competition and free entry, an
export subsidy is always optimal, since it helps the domestic ﬁrm to
sell more than others in the foreign market.
2.2 Optimal export subsidy with Bertrand competition
Consider our general model of price competition with an export speciﬁc subsidy,
so that the gross proﬁt function for the leader is:
ΠH =( pH − c + s)D(pH,β H)
where we remember that D(·) is the direct demand depending on the price of
the domestic ﬁrm pH and on the spillovers from the prices of the other ﬁrms
βH.T h i sp r o ﬁt function clearly satiﬁes ΠH
13 = −p2
HD1 > 0.
It is tedious to characterize the optimal export subsidy under barriers to
entry, but Appendix D solves for this in the case of the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation
of the demand function. Here we will focus on the free entry case, in which the
equilibrium conditions in the second stage are:
(p − c)D1(p,β)+D(p,β)=0
(pH − c + s)D1(pH,β H)+D(pH,β H)=0
(p − c)D(p,β)=F
where β =( n−2)g(p)+g(pH) is the spillover received by an international ﬁrm
from the strategies of all the other ﬁrms in the market and βH =( n − 1)g(p)
is the spillover for the domestic country. This system expresses prices and the
number of ﬁrms as functions of the subsidy s, but we know from Prop. 2 that
the price of foreign ﬁrms p and their spillover β are actually unchanged with
changes in the subsidy, while pH(s)a n dβH(s) depend on it. Hence, assuming
12t h a tt h ec o s to ft r a d es u b s i d i e si sg i v e nb yt h et a xr e v e n u en e c e s s a r yt oﬁnance
t h e m ,w ec a nw r i t et h ew e l f a r eo ft h ed o m e s t i cc o u n t r ya s :
W(s)=[ pH(s) − c]D[pH(s),β H(s)] − F =
=[ pH(s) − c]D[pH(s),β+ g(p) − g(pH)] − F
which is maximized by a subsidy satisfying the ﬁrst order condition:
D(pH,β H)+( pH − c)[D1 (pH,β H) − D2 (pH,β H)g0(pH)] = 0 (13)
If we now substitute this in the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the domestic
ﬁrm, we can derive a neater expression for the optimal export subsidy:
s∗
H =
(pH − c)D2 (pH,β H)g0(pH)
[−D1 (pH,β H)]
> 0 (14)
Clearly, also this is an implicit expression, since on the right hand side pH
depends on the optimal subsidy, however, this expression makes clear our main
point: the optimal export subsidy is positive. Summarizing:
Proposition 5. Under price competition and free entry, an export
subsidy is always optimal, since it helps the domestic ﬁrm to lower
its price in the foreign market.
The result overturns common wisdom for models with strategic complemen-
tarity and barriers to entry. An accomodating behaviour is not anymore optimal
because it would just induce new ﬁrms to enter. The only chance for the gov-
ernment to increase the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm is to induce an aggressive
behaviour. Then the ﬁrm will undercut the competitors gaining in market share
and will spread a low mark up over a large portion of the market, leaving the
few remaining ﬁrms with zero proﬁts.
An explicit characterization can be obtained in the case of a Logit demand,
Di = e−ξpi/
P
e−ξpj with ξ>0. In this case, international ﬁrms choose the
price p = c + F +1 /ξ and it is easy to derive that the optimal subsidy must
induce a price for the domestic ﬁrm equal to pH(s∗
H)=c +1 /ξ,w h i c hr e q u i r e s
a very simple expression for the optimal export subsidy:
s∗
H = F>0 (15)
Another explicit result for the optimal export subsidy can be derived in
models with isoelastic demand and in the Dixit-Stiglitz model which can be




















13delivers an equilibrium price pH = c/θ for the domestic ﬁrms and a higher price
p for all the other international ﬁrms through a positive export subsidy. In
















Here the intuition is simple and I will explore it in further detail. The free
entry condition pins down the price index P and the price of the foreign ﬁrms
independently from the domestic subsidy. This implies that the subsidy can be
chosen to maximize the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm net of the cost of the subsidy
taking as given the aggregate price index. This is the same as directly choosing
the price of the domestic ﬁrm without a subsidy to maximize proﬁts while
ignoring the eﬀect of the price choice on the price index. Such a choice delivers
a lower price than the one chosen by foreign ﬁrms, since those ﬁrms take in
consideration the eﬀect of their price on the aggregate price level and an increase
in the latter raises their demand level and hence their proﬁts. Consequently in
equilibrium the domestic ﬁrm undercuts its competitors and obtains a larger
market share, but this is possible only in presence of a positive export subsidy,
which reduces the eﬀective marginal cost of production and hence induces a
lower mark up for the national ﬁrm. The gain in market share is however
suﬃcient to create positive proﬁts for the national ﬁrm.
2.3 Discussion
Beyond subsidization, many other trade policies can aﬀect the proﬁts of export-
ing ﬁrms: for instance, policies which increase demand for the domestic product,
promote domestic R&D or reduce transport costs for exporting ﬁrms (Spencer
and Brander, 1983). A main example of the latter kind is given by investments
in infrastructures for international communication networks, but more indirect
examples include the establishment of easier business connections with other
countries, reduction of bureaucracy for export duties and even the development
of trade and currency unions to reduce import tariﬀs and uncertainty costs re-
lated with the exchange rate. In Appendix C I show that when entry in the
international markets is free, under weak conditions there are stronger incentives
for governments to invest in these forms of strategic export promotion .14
14Notice, however, that improvements of infrastructures may have a bilateral impact, both
on domestic exporters, but also on foreign ﬁr m st h a tw a n tt oe n t e rt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e t .
The entry of foreign ﬁrms, or the change in the market share of foreign ﬁrms following an
improvement in infrastructure will have an impact on the survival of domestic ﬁrms, on the
total number of domestic ﬁrms, and hence on the number of domestic exporters. In that
respect, looking at the endogenous entry of domestic ﬁrms in the export market, may modify
the predictions of the current model.
14Finally, one could also consider competition for the international markets
rather than competition in the international markets.15 Traditional models of
patent races are nested in our general framework (see Etro, 2002a, 2004) and
can be used to study trade policy for ﬁrms investing in some forms of innovation
to conquer foreign markets. Also in these contexts, export promotion is always
optimal if access to the international competition is free: in this case, subsidies
are simply R&D subsidies as shown in Etro (2006c); for a related analysis see
Impullitti (2006a,b).16
3 Exchange Rate Policy
Our model allows to study another important tool which is used by govern-
ments to promote exports: competitive devaluations. It is commonly taken for
granted that exchange rate devaluations are beneﬁcial to exporting ﬁrms, allow-
ing to increase demand for their products and providing a strategic advantage to
them. In this sense, there is a strategic incentive to implement unilateral com-
petitive devaluations directly under ﬁxed exchange rates or indirectly through
a monetary expansion which depreciates the currency when the exchange rate
is ﬂexible. As we will make clear, this is not generally true, but a devaluation
deﬁnitely gives a strategic advantage to exporting ﬁrms when free entry holds
in the foreign markets.
Our model of imperfect competition between international ﬁrms for a for-
eign market is particularly useful for such a purpose, since it is consistent with
international market segmentation, which allows ﬁrms to choose diﬀerent prices
for diﬀerent markets (in particular the price of a good in domestic currency
does not need to be the same in the domestic and the foreign market).17 Hence,
following Dornbusch (1987), we can endogenize the eﬀects of variations in the
nominal exchange rate on prices. The eﬀe c t so fe x c h a n g er a t ep o l i c yf o re x -
porting ﬁrms crucially depend on the location of production, on whether local
currency pricing or producer currency pricing holds18 and on the strategic re-
action of ﬁrms to the policy. In our partial equilibrium context, we will focus
on the strategic eﬀects of a devaluation on the domestic ﬁrm. Clearly, a de-
valuation has other consequences in general equilibrium, but the point here is
just to understand whether the usual claim that a devaluation gives a strategic
advantage to exporting ﬁr m si sc o r r e c t .
Our focus will be on a particular situation where all ﬁrms produce in their
domestic country, bear production costs in domestic currency, choose their strat-
15See Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) for a survey.
16See Etro (2002b) for this point in a general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian growth.
17In other words, the law of one price does not hold, as usually happens in the real world
because of transport costs and other frictions.
18See Engel (2000) and Betts and Devereux (2000) for theoretical discussions on local cur-
rency pricing versus producer currency pricing respectively in a standard Mundell-Fleming
model and in a new open macroeconomy model.
15egy taking into account the exchange rate and then export abroad. Under price
competition this corresponds to the case of producer currency pricing. Such a
case is typical of medium and small ﬁrms which are active at a national level,
often producing typical domestic products and exporting some of them abroad,
but also of larger ﬁrms which are not directly active in the foreign market under
consideration but sell their goods to distributors of this market.19 Once again,
we will separate the discussion between the cases of quantity competition and
price competition. The bottom line will be that competitive devaluations are
always desirable to provide a strategic advantage to domestic ﬁrms when foreign
markets are competitive.
Potentially, one could extend this framework to derive an optimal compet-
itive devaluation comparing its beneﬁts on the export side with its costs on
the import side. However, one must alwa y sk e e pi nm i n dt h a tt h i sa n a l y s i si s
relevant in the short run: as well known, in the long run, markets equilibrate in
such a way that nominal variables, as the exchange rate, are irrelevant.
3.1 Competitive devaluations with Cournot competition
Imagine a quantity competition in the foreign market. Foreign demand for






where xj is production for ﬁrm j, but
revenues in domestic currency are Eixipi where Ei is the price of the foreign
currency in terms of currency of country i, that is the exchange rate of this
country. For expository purposes, imagine an initial situation where, without
loss of generality, all the exchange rates (with the foreign country where ﬁrms
compete) are unitary. If the domestic country can adopt a competitive devalu-
ation and rise the exchange rate to the level E,t h ep r o ﬁto ft h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm
becomes:
ΠH = Ezp(z,βH) − c(z) (17)
w h i c hc a nb er e w r i t t e ni no u rf r a m e w o r ka sΠH (z,βH,s)w h e r es = E − 1,
implying ΠH
13 = p + zp1 = c0(z)/E > 0. Hence Prop. 1 and 3 apply and
19The alternative situation, which is not relevant for our purposes, emerges when interna-
tional ﬁrms produce and compete abroad with independent production units. This is typical
of multinational ﬁrms which are directly active in other countries where they sell their prod-
ucts. Under price competition, this case of local currency pricing with market power implies
no pass-through of the nominal exchange rate on prices. In this situation, a devaluation is not
g o i n gt oa ﬀect the equilibrium in the foreign market. All ﬁrms would choose the same prices in
foreign currency after a devaluation, but the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm would be artiﬁcially
increased in the domestic currency. The same would happen under quantity competition,
since production decisions abroad would be independent from the exchange rate again, but
proﬁts in domestic currency would be inﬂated by a devaluation. It is clear that such a gain
in proﬁts should be compared with the losses for the society in terms of higher prices of the
imports. However, this is not our focus; what matters for our purposes is that in such a
context there is not a strategic incentive to implement a competitive devaluation. This policy
does not give a real strategic advantage to the domestic ﬁrm in the foreign market but just
artiﬁcially increases its proﬁts.
16tell us that after a devaluation the domestic ﬁrm will increase its production
level. Under barriers to entry, as long as strategic substitutability holds, the
other ﬁrms will decrease production so that the market share of the domestic
ﬁrm increases (as it was shown by Dornbush, 1987): this creates a strategic
incentive to devaluate.20 Also under free entry the domestic ﬁrm expands its
market share, but the other ﬁrms produce the same as before the devaluation,
while some of them exit the market.21 Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6. Under quantity competition, a) when the number
of ﬁr m si se x o g e n o u st h e r ei sas t r a t e gic incentive for competitive
devaluations if strategic substitutability holds and b) when entry is
free there is always a strategic incentive for competitive devaluations.
Notice that a devaluation always increases exports. When entry is free and
goods are perfect substitutes, the elasticity of domestic production with respect
t ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ei ss i m p l y( σ + µ)
−1, that is decreasing in the elasticity
of the marginal cost σ and in the mark up µ =[ Ep− c(z)]/c(z). Since the
devaluation does not aﬀect the equilibrium price, the elasticity of exports Ezp
t ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sj u s t1+( σ + µ)
−1 > 1.
3.2 Competitive devaluations with Bertrand competition
The case of price competition is the most interesting, since it is the usual case
under study in macroeconomic models on the exchange rate and probably the
most realistic for our purposes.
Imagine again an initial situation where all the exchange rates are unitary.
In particular, the price of the foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, E,
is initially unitary. This implies that if p∗
H is the price of the domestic good in
foreign currency, the price of the same good in domestic currency is pH = Ep∗
H.
If the latter is constant, a devaluation (an increase in E) will reduce the price
in foreign currency, and an appreciation of the exchange rate will increase it.
However, prices in domestic currency for foreign segmented markets can be
changed after a devaluation and our purpose is exactly to check how they are
changed.
Since production takes place at home and demand depends on prices in
foreign currency, the relevant proﬁt function for the domestic ﬁrm is:











which can be rewritten in our framework with z =1 /p∗
H and s = E − 1. With
such a change of variables, the strategic variable for each ﬁrm becomes the price
20But it also creates a negative terms of trade eﬀect which can eliminate the strategic
incentive to devaluate if there are many domestic ﬁrms.
21In this case, when there are many domestic ﬁrms, there is not a terms of trade eﬀect and
a devaluation remains desirable from a strategic point of view.
17in foreign currency (but on the basis of its value in terms of domestic currency,
which is what matters in the proﬁt function). Clearly, for all the international
ﬁrms except the domestic one, the price is the same in foreign and domestic
currency, p∗
j = pj for j 6= H.
Deﬁning with µi =( pi − c)/c the mark-up of ﬁrm i,a n dw i t h i = −p∗
iD1/D >




 i − 1
while the second order conditions require ηi < 2 i,w h e r eηi ≡− p∗
iD11/D1 is
the price elasticity of the slope of demand and represents the degree of convexity
of the demand function.22
As usual, the incentives to change strategy for the domestic ﬁrm depend on
the cross eﬀect ΠH
13 = −p∗2
H [D + p∗
HD1], which is positive in equilibrium. Hence,
t h ep r i c eo ft h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm in foreign currency p∗
H is always decreasing in the
exchange rate, that is after a devaluation. In general, Prop. 1 implies that a
competitive devaluation is not desirable under barriers to entry. Such a policy
forces the domestic ﬁrm to decrease its price in foreign currency, which induces
also the other ﬁr m st od ot h es a m e ,r e d u c i n gp r o ﬁts for all ﬁrms in the market.
Actually, there is a strategic incentive to appreciate the currency, which induces
the domestic ﬁrm to increase its own price in foreign currency and the other
ﬁrms to do the same.23
When entry is free, the domestic ﬁrm does not obtain a strategic advantage
when induced to increase its own price because this would promote entry in the
foreign market. According to Prop. 3, there is a strategic incentive to devaluate
the exchange rate. This would reduce the price of the domestic ﬁrm in the
foreign currency. Foreign ﬁrms would not change their own prices, but fewer
w o u l de n t e ri nt h em a r k e ts ot h a tt h em a r k e ts h a r eo ft h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm would
expand. In this case, a devaluation has also a direct beneﬁcial eﬀect, since it
increases revenues of the domestic ﬁr mi nd o m e s t i cc u r r e n c y ;t h ep o s i t i v ed i r e c t
and strategic eﬀects of a devaluation should be compared with the costs in
terms of a higher price of imports, which is beyond the scope of this discussion.
What matters here, is that the usual claim that devaluations give a strategic
22Notice that a devaluation has always a direct positive eﬀect on the proﬁt of the domestic
ﬁrm, since it increases revenues in domestic currency. At the same time, there are direct costs
from a devaluation, for instance in terms of higher prices of imports. However, these are not
the eﬀects we are interested in, since the case for a strategic advantage for the domestic ﬁrm
depends on the indirect eﬀect on the equilibrium strategies.
23Again, this is just the strategic incentive for the government: an appreciation would
also have a negative direct eﬀect on proﬁts, reducing the mark-up of the domestic ﬁrm, and
ﬁnally, it will induce other eﬀects for the society like a reduction in the price of imports.
The comparison between these direct eﬀects and the strategic eﬀect provides the optimal
unilateral policy, but the crucial point, here, is that there is not a strategic incentive to
implement competitive devaluations when domestic ﬁrms export in markets with barriers to
entry.
18advantage to exporting ﬁrms is correct only for competitive foreign markets.
Summarizing:
Proposition 7. Under price competition, a) when the number of
ﬁrms is exogenous, there is a strategic incentive to appreciate the
domestic currency, but b) when entry is free there is a strategic in-
centive for competitive devaluations.
The bottom line is quite intuitive. Devaluations can be deleterious for ex-
porting ﬁrms when they induce a war between international ﬁrms to reduce
prices in foreign currency and this happens when there are clear barriers to
entry. However, when entry is free, international ﬁrms cannot undertake such
a war and the domestic ﬁrm can unilaterally decrease its price in foreign cur-
rency expanding its market share: only in this case there is a strategic incentive
toward competitive devaluations.24
Finally, we can look at welfare in the foreign country. Under barriers to entry
prices decrease after a devaluation, which unambiguously improves welfare since
the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed and hence foreign consumers can have more of each
good at a lower price. Under free entry, just the price of the domestic good
decreases, while the others remain at the same level and some international
ﬁrms exit the market. However, this is not likely to reduce foreign welfare.
For instance, under isoelastic utility as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, the price
index remains the same before and after the devaluation, hence welfare does
not change abroad.
Summing up, we have evaluated the strategic incentives to implement a
competitive devaluation. Contrary to common wisdom, such a policy does not
always give a strategic advantage to exporting ﬁrms: this happens when these
ﬁrms operate in competitive foreign markets where entry is free, but not in
markets where there are barriers to entry.
24We can understand better the implications of a devaluation if we look at the change in
the foreign price of the domestic good after the devaluation. Focusing on the case with free








as the elasticity of this price with respect to the
exchange rate, we can derive a simple expression:
φ =
 H − 1








H)/D1 > 0. The percentage reduction in the foreign price
after a devaluation is smaller when demand is highly elastic ( H is large, or in other words
when the mark up is small) and when it is not too convex (ηH is small). We can also have a
clue on the size of this elasticity. For instance, if demand is approximately linear in the price,
it is always below 50% and decreasing in the mark up: mark ups for the domestic ﬁrm up to
50% of the marginal cost imply  H ' 3 and hence φ below a third. However, when demand
is isoelastic (as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model) we have ηH =1+ H, which implies levels of φ
always above 50%.
194C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I adopted a simple model to show the general optimality of unilat-
eral export promotion policies in foreign markets where free entry holds. The
implications for markets with price competition are strong: the opening up of
such markets to entry of foreign ﬁrms would change the optimal unilateral trade
policy from export taxation to export subsidization and would create new strate-
gic incentives to implement competitive devaluations. Notice that limitations
to the possibility of adopting export subsidies (due to international agreements)
and of implementing competitive devaluations (as for countries joining monetary
unions) would push toward other indirect forms of export promotion as invest-
ments in infratructures or R&D promotion to provide a competitive advantage
to domestic ﬁrms in the international markets.
Our model could be relevant for trade between developed and developing
countries whose markets open up. A spectacular example is given by China,
whose huge market is starting to massively import from the Western world.
China lacks many advanced industries and, in the near future, it will represent
a crucial market for automobiles, high technology commodities, luxury goods,
and so on. Our results suggest that the gains from promoting exports of these
items from the Western world will be quite large and trade wars for the Chinese
market may be behind the corner.
Further theoretical research could extend these results. On one side, one
could study more complex models of interaction between ﬁrms and governments
and introduce this set up in a standard two country framework of international
trade. Moreover it would be interesting to extend the model of strategic trade
policy for the domestic market in presence of free entry. On the other side, one
could analyse of the strategic eﬀects of devaluations in general equilibrium mod-
els and study the strategic eﬀects of devaluations on both foreign and domestic
markets. Finally, it would be interesting to fully characterize equilibria in trade
wars based on export subsidization or in exchange rate wars.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
To verify the comparative statics of the system (4)-(5)-(7) with respect to s,l e tu s
use the deﬁnitions where β =( n − 2)h(x)+h(z) and βH ≡ (n − 1)h(x) to rewrite
it in terms of the three unknown variables x, z and βH:
Π1 [x,h(z) − h(x)+βH,0] = 0
ΠH
1 [z,βH,s]=0
Π[x,h(z) − h(x)+βH,0] = F
(19)
T h es e c o n de q u a t i o np r o v i d e sa ni m p l i c i tr e l a t i o n s h i pz = z(βH,s) with ∂z/∂βH =
−ΠH
12/ΠH
11 and ∂z/∂s = −ΠH
13/ΠH
11 > 0. Substituting this expression we obtain a
system of two equations in two unknowns, x and βH:
Π1 [x,h(z(βH,s)) − h(x)+βH,0] = 0
Π[x,h(z(βH,s)) − h(x)+βH,0] = F









































11 > 0 and Π11 −Π12h0(x)+∆/Π11 < 0 to
































¤ R 0i fΠH
13 R 0
which proves the Proposition. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: The political economy of export promotion
Let us explicit a welfare function for the domestic country. Deﬁne C(s)=
C [z(s),β H(s),s] as a reduced form for the social cost of the policy, which we as-
sume increasing and convex: for instance, in case of subsidies, this is the tax revenue
necessary to ﬁnance them. The the optimal policy of export promotion is:
s∗
H =a r gm a xW(s) = argmax[πH − C(s)]




In the text, we derived optimal export subsidies/taxes under both closed and compet-
itive markets.
Here I want to extend the model to take into account the lobbying activity of the
exporting ﬁrm, which Grossman and Helpman (1994) have shown to be one of the
main determinants of export policy, since exporters represent a minoritarian but well
organized part of the society. The easiest way to endogenize lobbying is to imagine
that the government chooses its policy to maximize a weighted average of welfare and
ﬁrm’s proﬁts:
s =a r gm a x[ ( 1− λ)W(s)+λπH] = argmax[πH − (1 − λ)C(s)]
where λ is the weight given to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm because of lobbying activity.
Given λ, the equilibrium policy will satisfy the ﬁrst order condition:
SI + ΠH
3 =( 1− λ)C0(s) (21)
which delivers a policy sH(λ) increasing in λ, that is in the weight given by the
politician to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in its objective function, and equal to the optimal one
if this weight is zero (sH(0) = s∗
H). We will derive an example of a politico-economic
equilibrium policy in the next section. Notice that the strategic incentive to adopt
export promoting policies is the same undel lobbying, just the costs of the policy
23changes. If we deﬁne C[sH(λ)] as the social cost of lobbying, this is clearly increasing
in the lobbying activity.
As an example, let us look at lobbying for export subsidies in the model with
Cournot competition. Under free entry and perfectly substitute goods, assuming that
marginal costs are increasing enough and deﬁning σ = c00(z)z/c0(z) as the elasticity




1+λ + λσ(1 − ε)/ε
1 − λ − λσ
¸
which is clearly increasing and even convex in the weight that politicians give to the
proﬁts of the exporting ﬁrm λ. Moreover, the equilibrium subsidy is unambiguously
increasing in σ but, contrary to the optimal subsidy, decreasing in ε for λ or σ large
enough.
Finally, the lobbying activity by the exporting ﬁrm determines λ,a n dt h i sf r a m e -
work provides a simple way to understand the beneﬁts of lobbying for this ﬁrm. If the
cost of the lobbying activity to obtain a weight λ in the objective function of politicians
is L(λ), which is assumed increasing and convex, the investment in lobbying will select:














whose right hand side contains the ratio between the marginal cost of lobbying for
the exporting ﬁrm, and the product of the marginal cost of subsidization with the
derivative of the policy with respect to λ, which is just the social marginal cost of
lobbying. The bottom line is that even if there is a strategic incentive to export
promotion, lobbying activity induces excessive export promotion.
25 If this distortion
is strong, a commitment to free trade may be optimal for domestic welfare.
26
Appendix C: Supporting demand and reducing costs
Many diﬀerent policies can aﬀect the proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms. Imagine some
policy which increases demand for the domestic product and makes it more rigid
relative to the demand for foreign ﬁrms. Under quantity competition, the proﬁto ft h e
domestic ﬁrm would be:
ΠH (z,βH,s)=zp(z,βH,s) − c(z)
25However, notice that, if other groups are lobbying the equilibrium may imply a
policy closer to the optimal one, since its costs are born by the all society.
26One could also study issues of international policy coordination in this framework
(see Alesina, Angeloni and Etro, 2005, and Etro, 2006, for a recent related work). I
will not pursue this here.
24with p3 (z,βH,s) > 0 and p13 (z,βH,s) < 0.H e n c e ,ΠH
13 = p3+zp13 is positive only
if the export promoting policy does not make demand too rigid: in such a case, when
entry is free, by Prop. 3, overinvestment in export promotion is optimal and makes the
domestic ﬁrm more aggressive abroad. Notice that overinvestment could emerge even
when the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, but only under strategic substitutability, by
Prop.1 (and not in presence of too many domestic ﬁrms). Things are however diﬀerent













=( pH − c)D(pH,β H,s)
with D3 (pH,β H,s) > 0 and D13 (pH,β H,s) > 0.S i n c eΠH
13 = −p2
H [D3 +( pH − c)D13] <
0, according to Prop. 3, we always have a tendency toward underinvestment in export
promoting policies, which again induces an aggressive behaviour of the domestic ﬁrm
abroad. Notice that the opposite result would emerge with barriers to entry according
to Prop. 1. Summarizing:
Proposition A1. When export promotion increases demand for domestic goods
without making it too rigid: under quantity competition, overinvestment in export
promotion is optimal a) only under strategic substitutability when the number of
ﬁrms is exogenous, b) always under free entry; under price competition, a) overinvest-
ment in export promotion is optimal when the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, and b)
underinvestment is optimal under free entry.
In a trade context, transport costs are crucial since the marginal cost of exports
depends on them. The government can implement policies to reduce transport costs
for all exporting ﬁrms. A main example is given by investments in infrastructures
for international communication networks, but more indirect examples include the
establishment of easier business connections with other countries, reduction of bu-
reaucracy for export duties and even the development of trade and currency unions to
reduce import tariﬀs and uncertainty costs related with the exchange rate. The follow-
ing analysis can be applied to policies to promote cost reducing investment (process
R&D).
Consider a policy which can reduce the marginal costs of the domestic ﬁrm through
a reduction in transport costs. Assume that marginal costs are constant for the domes-
tic ﬁrm and equal to c(s) with c(0) = c, which is the same level faced by international
ﬁrms, and c0(s) < 0: the higher is the investment the smaller is the marginal cost.
Under quantity competition we have the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm:
ΠH (z,βH,s)=z [p(z,βH) − c(s)]
which implies ΠH













=( pH − c)D(pH,β H)
25which also implies ΠH
13 = p2
Hc0(s)D1 > 0. The consequence is immediate from Prop.
1 and Prop. 3: while there may or may not be a strategic incentive to reduce transport
costs when there are barriers to entry abroad, under free entry, this incentive always
exists:
Proposition A2. When the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, there is (not) a strategic
incentive to reduce transport costs under strategic substitutability (complementarity),
but when there is free entry there is always a strategic incentive to reduce transport
costs.
Clearly the result applies also when the cost function is not linear but the policy
can reduce the marginal cost of transport. Moreover, the result naturally extends to
any form of export promotion which reduces some kind of costs for the exporting ﬁrms,
for instance labour cost, ﬁnancial costs or taxation.
Appendix D: Optimal export subsidy under price
competition
In this Appendix I will show how to solve for the optimal trade policy in a model
of price competition with a demand function al aDixit and Stiglitz (1977) with and













is the price index. This can be derived from a utility
function (or a production function) where 1/(1 − θ) is the elasticity of substitution
between goods (inputs). Diﬀerent ﬁrms produce the diﬀerentiated goods and engage
in price competition. To re-express this model in terms of our variables, let us set
xi ≡ 1/pi and h(xi)=x
θ
1−θ














It follows that Π12 > 0 at the optimal point satisfying Π1 =0 , which implies strategic
complementarity, as customary under competition in prices, and Π13 > 0.T h i si sn o t
by chance, since (23) can be seen as a particular case of (3).
Consider ﬁrst the case of barriers to entry and an exogenous number of ﬁrms n.
In the exact solution, the price of the foreign ﬁrms p = p(s) and of the domestic ﬁrm























































26and we know that both prices must be decreasing in both the subsidy and the number














A closed form solution for this problem does not exist, but one can derive an approx-
imate solution in the case ﬁrms choose their prices ignoring their impact on the price
index, which is reasonable for n big enough. In this case we have the equilibrium





1−θ [c − s − cθ]
θ
h
























¸ < 0 (26)
Let us now solve for the exact optimal export subsidy under price competition and
free entry. The price of the foreign ﬁrms p(s) and of the domestic ﬁrm pH(s), and




















From (25) and (27) one can derive the price of the other international ﬁrms implicitly


































where I used (27) in the second line. It is immediate to verify that the optimal
subsidy must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition pH(s)=c/θ. Substituting for pH in





















which can be rewritten as (16).
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